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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF U'TAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Resptmdent, 
-vs.-
HUGH F. ROWLEY and DONALD 
SPENCER, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 9894 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS, 
HUGH F. ROWLEY and DONALD SPENCER 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
Hugh F. Rowley and Donald Spencer each appeal 
from a conviction of assault with a deadly weapon and 
attempted second degree burglary. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court of the Third Judicial District in 
and for Tooele County, State of Utah, sitting with a 
jury, found Hugh F. Rowley and Donald Spencer both 
guilty of the offenses of assault with a deadly weapon 
and attempted second degree burglary, and sentenced 
each of the defendants to the Utah State Prison for an 
indeterminate term as provided by law, said sentences 
torun consecutively. 
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RE.LIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Hugh F. Rowley and Donald Spencer each seek a 
reversal of the Judgment and Sentence of the District 
Court in and for Tooele County, State of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 22, 1962, a complaint was filed in the 
City Court of Tooele City, Tooele County, State of Utah, 
charging both Hugh F. Rowley and Donald Spencer with 
committing the crimes of assault with a deadly weapon 
and attempted second degree burglary on the 21st day 
of October, 1962. 
On November 30, 1962, a preliminary hearing was held 
before the H·onorable M. Earl Marshall, City Judge of 
Tooele City, at which time both offenses, upon stipula-
tion of the parties, were heard toget'her, and upon order 
of the Court both defendants were bound over for trial 
in the Third District Court in and for Tooele County, 
State of Utah. 
Informations were thereupon filed against the de-
fendants by the Dastrict Attorney of the Third Judicial 
District charging both the defendants with the crimes 
of assault with a deadly weapon and attempted second 
degree burglary. 
A notice of alibi and a Tequest for a polygraph 
examination was filed wri.th ·the District Court by Robert 
B. Hansen, attorney for the defendants, and thereafter 
a stipulation was entered into by and between the defend-
ants, their attorney Robert B. Hansen and the District 
Attorney respecting the admissi·on into evidence of the 
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results of a polygraph test to be administered to Hugh 
F. Rowley, the results thereof to be used by the de-
fendants or the State of Utah, regardless of the results 
of said test. 
A trial was thereupon held at Tooele, Utah, before 
the Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson, one of the Judges 
of the Third Judicial District Court in and for Tooele 
County, State of Utah, sitting with a jury, on January 
18, 1963, both offenses being joined for trial. Proceed-
ings were then had which resulted in the conviction of 
both defendants on charges of assault with a deadly 
weapon and attempted se~cond degree burglary, and it is 
submitted that certain errors were committed by the 
Court during the trial of the case, said assignments of 
error being set out and discussed fully in the points here-
under, said errors constituting and being reversible 
error. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS HEREIN, 
WHICH IS CERTIFIED TO CONTAIN A FULL, TRUE AND 
COMPLETE TRANSCRIPT OF SAID PROCEEDINGS, EX .. 
CEPT AS THE SAME ARE DISPENSED WITH BY THE 
COURT, DOEtS NOT INDICATE OR SHOW ANY EVIDENCE 
THAT THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 77-31-1(1), UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, WERE COMPLIED WITH AS 
REQUIRED BY THE STATUTE. 
The applicable provisions of Section 77-31-1 ( 1) pro-
vide as follows : 
77-31-1. Order of trial. - The jury having 
been impanelled and sworn, the trial must proceed 
in the following order: 
3·· 
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(1) If the information or indictment is for a 
felony, the clerk must read it and state the plea of 
the defendant to the jury. In all other cases this 
formality may be dispensed with. 
The Court, after the jury was impanelled and sworn, 
mentioned to the jury (R. p. 3, lines 7-9) that each of the 
defendant~s had entered a plea of not guilty to the 
charges, but there is no mention or evidence in the record 
on appeal that the clerk read the 1informations to the jury 
as provided for under Seetion 77-31~1(1) for the offenses 
of assault with a deadly weapon and attempted second 
degree burglary as required under said section and which 
is the first order 'Of trial with which the Court must 
proceed after the ju~y is impanelled. 
The purpose of reading the information and stating, 
the plea of the defendant thereto to the jury has been 
defined and clarified by two decisions of the Utah Su-
preme Court. The Utah Supreme Court in the case of 
St,ate v. Solomon, 93 U. 70, 77; 71 P.2d 104, (1937), 
stated in substance that under the statute reqUiiring the 
clerk to read the information and state the plea to the 
jury, the purpose of reading the information being 
to inform the jury of the nature ·of the charge and issue 
before it for trial. 
This posrition was 'again reiterated and reaffirmed 
by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of State v. Spen-
cer, 101 U. 274, 281; 117 P.2d 455, 458, (1941) rehearing 
denied 101 U. 287, 289; 121 P.2d 912, 913, (1942), wherein 
the Oourt stated: 
The provision for reading the information to 
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the jury, and struting the plea of the defendant 
(Section 105-32-1, R.S.U. 1933), is in order that 
the jury may be informed of the charge and the 
issues before it for trial. Thus even the jury must 
unders,t;and from the information, not aided by 
the bill of particulars, what and which offense as 
defined by the S'tatute it 1is charged defendant 
committed. 
The Court on rehearing further stat·ed: 
The issues established by an informrution or a 
complaint and the plea of not guilty thereto con-
stitute the foundation of each crimrrnal trial. 
Upon those issues the relevancy of the proffered 
evidence is determined. 
It is therefore imperative 'to protect the rights of 
the defendants that the provisions of Section 77-31-1 ( 1) 
be fully and completely complied with so that the jury, 
before the evidence pro and con is presented, is fully 
appraised of the charges against the defendant contained 
in the information so rthat rit can weigh the' evidence as 
received as it relates to the charges. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN 
FAILING TO GIVE AN INSTRUCTION AS ·TO THE EFFECT 
OF A STIPULATION FOR THE TAKING OF A POLYGRAPH 
TEST BY HUGH F. ROWLEY AND AS TO THE PURPOSE 
FOR WHICH THE RESULT'S OF SAID TEST ARE ADMIS-
SIBLE AND THE WEIGHT TO BE GIVEN TO SAID RE-
SULTS. 
In the case at bar, the following s'tipulation in regard 
to 'the results o:f the lie-detector 'test on I-I ugh F. Rowley 
wasc made between the defense and the prosecution (R. 
86, lines 10-24) : 
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MR. HANSEN: We would like to ma:ke a 
stipulation in regard to a polygraph test with 
the defendant, Hugh Rowley. 
May it be stipulated, Robert lVIcl\ianama, an 
officer in the Salt L~ake Oity Police Department 
gave a p'olygraph test to Hugh Rowlery, that 1\Ir. 
McManama i's a qualifi·ed person to give such ex-
amination; that Mr. Rowley denied he h'ad any-
thing to do with these particular offenses, and 
1that Officer McManama was of the opinion he 
was not telling the truth when he made these 
S·tatements ; 
It is also requested that the District Attor-
ney stipulate at th.e present time, the degree 'of 
accuracy of the polygraph tests is approximrutely 
99 degrees accurate. 
May it he so stipulated~ 
MR. BLACK: We are certainly agreeable to 
that sttipulationn, your Honor. 
It should be noted that the examiner was never called 
to testify as rto the results; it being stipulated that he was 
qualified, that the accuracy of the tests was approxi-
mately 99 degrees accurate, and that he was of the 
opinion that Mr. Rowley was lying when he denied any-
thing to do with the particular offenses. The court failed 
to give :any instruction relative to the effect of this 
stipulaJtion. 
There has been a gre1at deal of judicial reluctance to 
recognize the worth of lie-detector evidence in the court 
room. The Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appe·als in the 
case ·of Henderson v. St.ate, 230 P. 2d 495,23 ALR 2d 1292 
( 1951) in affirming a first degree rape conviction quoted 
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from leading authorities on the subject of lie-detector 
tests which pointed out some of the chief difficultie's in 
the diagnosis of deception by the lie-detector technique, 
which are fully set forth in the body of the opinion. 
The Supreme Court of Arizona in a recent decision 
explained at great length the effect of a lie-detector stip-
ulationn. StOJte v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P2d 895, 
900-901 (1962). In that case the defendant was tried and 
convicted of possessing narcotics, who, together with the 
county attorney and his counsel, s.tJipulated to a poly-
graph exmnination, said stipulation providing that the 
test would be admissible at the trial. The operator was 
permitted, over the obj·ections of the defendant, to testify 
as to the results of the examination. The c;ourt then, 
pursuant to Rule 346 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, after the jury returned a verdict of guilty and 
before sentence was entered, certified the issue of the 
admissibility of the tes~t to th·e Supreme Court o.f Ari-
zona. 
The court held, this being a case of first impression 
in Arizona, that the the results of a lie-detector test upon 
stipulation are admissible to corroborate other evidence 
of defendant's participation in the crime charged, but 
wi~th the folloWJing qualifications and limitations ex-
pressed by the court : 
That if such evidence is admitted the trial 
judge should instruct the jury that the examiner's 
testimony does not tend to prove or disprove 
any element of the crime with which a defendant 
is charged but at most tends 'only to indicate that 
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at the time of the' exarll'inaUon defendant was not 
telling the. truth. Further, the jury members 
should be instructed that it is for thern to deter-
mine what corroborative weight and effect such 
testimony should be given. State v. Valdez, supra. 
In the case at bar, there is not only an absence of 
an instructlion to guide the jury in determining the 
weight, relevance and effect of this stipulation, which is 
:essential, but the jury never had the opportunity to hear 
. directly from the examiner as to his :flindings or to learn 
of the condition and circumstances surrounding the test. 
Furthermore, the stipulation is so ambiguous, uncertain 
and tindefinite as to the exact results of the test as to 
mislea:d and ~onfuse the jury, the. inference being, in the 
absence of an instruction by the court, that the stipula-
tion on behalf of the defendant Hugh F. Rowley, was 
tantamount to a confes·sion ·On his part. 
It is, therefore, submitted that the trlial court com-
mitted reversible and prejudicial error in not instructing 
the jury as to tlie effect of this stipulation regarding the 
lie detector test. The said instruction should have con-
tained the charge that the results of a lie-detector test do 
not tend 1to prove or disp:r'ove any element of the crime 
with whiich the defendant is charged, but at most tends 
only to indicate that at the time of the examination the 
defendant was not telling the: truth. It should again be 
reiterated and emphasized ~that the stipulation in question 
did not reveal the exact results of the test, but only 
indicated in the opinion of the examiner, who was not 
even present at the trial, that the defendant, Hugh F. 
Rowley, was lying when he stated that 'he had nothing to 
s· 
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do with the particular offenses. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT, IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY (INSTRUC-
TION NO.5-B) REGARDING THE ELEMENT'S NECESSARY 
TO CONSTITUTE ATTEMPTED SECOND DEGREE BUR-
GLARY, COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT IN-
STRUCTING THE JURY AS TO THE NECESSITY OF FIND-
ING THAT THE CRIME WAS NOT COMMITTED DUE 'TO 
SOME AGENCY OR FORCE NOT SE'T IN MOTION BY THE 
DEFENDANTS. 
Section 76-1-30, Utah Code Annotated 1953, defines 
an attempt as : 
Any act done with intent to commit a crime, 
and tending but failing to effect rits commission, 
*** 
In the case of State v. Prince, 75 Utah 205, 214; 284 P. 
108, 111, the Utah Supreme Court in commenting what 
constitute·s an attempt undeT Section 76-1-30, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, held that the failure to consumm·ate the 
crime is an essential element where the charge is an 
attempt to eommit a crime. The court, in instructing the 
jury as to the necessary elements constituting the crime 
of attempt to commit extortion, stated: 
If you believe therefore fvom the evidence 
beyond a reas'onable doubt that the defendant in-
tended to commit the crime of extortion as charged 
in the information and eoupled with that :intent 
did some act or acts charged in the informati'On 
but failed to effect the commission of the com-
pleted cDime through · the intervention of some 
agency nnt set in m'otion by the defendant him-
self then you should find the defendant guilty of 
9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
an attempt to commit the crime of extortion. State 
v. Prirnce, supra. 
In the case at bar the court in its Instruction No. 5-
B did not define and m~ke clear this element in its 
charge to the jury and therefore committed reversible 
error. The instruction is as follows: 
Before you can convict a defendant of at-
tempted burglary in the Second Degree, you must 
believe from the ·evidence, and be convinced be-
yond a reasonable doubt that e'ach of the follow-
ing elements are true: 
1. That the defendant being considered, on 
or about the 21st of October, 1962, in the county 
of Tooele, Strute of Utah, did an act with intent 
to unlawfully enter the build[ng of the J. C. Pen-
ney Company. 
'(2) 'That the intent of the said defendant 
was 1to enter the said building by forcibly breruk-
ing intro the said building. 
( 3) ·That the s~a!id defendant at the said 
time of the act, if any, was intending to commit 
larceny in the said building. 
( 4) rThat the said aet, if any, was done in 
the nlight time with an intent at said time and 
place to enter the s~aid building. 
It should be noted that rthe court, while mentioning 
the elements of intent to commit tthe crime and the per-
formance of som·e act toward the commission of the 
c~ime, did not maker mention or instruct the jury as to 
the necessary element of a failure to consummate· the 
crime through the intervention of ra force or agency inde-
pendent of the defendants. 
10 
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POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
IN ITS INSTRUCTION NO. 5-C IN CHARGING THE JURY 
AS TO WHAT CONS'TITUTES A PRINCIPAL AS DEFINED 
IN SECTION 76-1-44, UTAH OODE ANNOTATED 1953, 
THERE NOT BEING SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 'TO SUS-
TAIN THE GIVING OF THIS CHARGE. 
The court in its Insrtruction No. 5-C to the jury em-
bodied in the charge the language of Section 76-1-44, 
rtah Code Annotated 1953, which defines principals to 
a crime as: 
All pers'ons concerned in the' commission of a 
crime, either felony or misdemeanor, whether they 
directly commit the act constituting the offense 
or aid .and abet in its commission*** 
The case of State v. Ba;um, 47 Utah 7, 9; 151 P. 518, 
519 (1915) held that before the language of the Utah 
statute on "Principles," now Section 76-1-44, Utah Oode 
Annotated 1953, may be contained in a charge, the plead-
ings and the evidence must sustain d.t. In the Baum case 
the defendant was convicted of burglary in the seeond 
degree~ On appeal the Supreme Court of Ut:ah held that 
the jury erred in using the language of the section on 
"Principals" and instructing the jury concerning defend-
ant's part in the crime charged, there not being sufficient 
evidence to sustain such a charge. The court stated: 
There was no evidence to sh'ow, and no one 
claimed, that the defendant but aided or abetted 
in the commission of the offense, or, not being 
present, advised or encouraged its commission. 
There, hence, was no occas~on to give that kind 
of a charge. Under the circumstances, we think 
it was misleading. and harmful. State v. Baum, 
supra. 
11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In the ca:se at bar, even assuming that the state has 
established, that the defendants were both at the scene of 
the crime, there is a lack of evidence to justify the giving 
of Instruction No. 5-C by the court to the jury. If the 
defendants are guilty, one of them committing the 
crimes charged and the other being a principal, which 
one ·of the defendants for instance .attempted burglary 
and which of the defendants aided or abetted~ 
In regard to the defendant, Hugh F. Riowley, and his 
alleged participation in the crimes, the only evidence 
possibly connecting him to the offenses charg~d is that 
there mtight have been a similarity between his shoes and 
the he-el prints taken from the roof of a building near 
the scene ·of the crime (R. 66, lines 19 through 30), to-
gether with the evidence of James Portwood, a w1tness 
for the prosecution, who testified that there were two 
people in the car ·that drove away after the shootJing. 
Portwood, however, testified that he could not tell 
whether the occupants of the car were men or women 
(R. 36, lines 5 through 6), the only other evidence being 
that the defendants, Rowley and Spencer, were picked 
up in a car that Portwood testified was the same one 
that drove away from ·the scene of the crime (R. 37, lines 
7 through 17). It is, therefore, submitted that the evi-
dence in this case is not sufficient •to justify the giving 
of Instruction No. 5-C and that the court committed re-
versible errorr in so doting. 
It should als;o be noted that Sheriff Fay Gillette on 
cross-examination as to whether any attempt had been 
made to identify Spencer and Rowley by anyone who 
12 
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was present at the scene of the crime responded as fol-
lows: 
Q. Wias there any attempt made to identify Mr. 
Spencer and Mr. Rowley by anyone who was 
at the scene of this c~ime tha·t night~ (R. 
72, lines 29 through 30 ; R. 73, line 1). 
A. Yes. 
Q. Can you tell us when that attempted identifi-
cation was made~ And who was present, 
and whatthe results were~ 
A. I think it was the 23rd. 
' I think Mr. ,Jensen, and Sidney Smith we-re 
present. 
But I do not know what the result was, be-
cause I was with the prisoners in the line-up, 
and I was not over on the other side, S'O I 
do not know what the result was. 
Q. Who was conducting the line-up~ 
A. I think Deputy Sheriff Pitt was conducting 
the line-up. 
MR. HANSEN: I think that is all. (R. 73, 
lines 2 through 12). 
Deputy Sheriff P1itt, ll'or anyone f'Or that matter, 
was called by the State to identify the defendants, Hugh 
F. Rowley ·and Donald Spencer, as being the individuals 
who committed the crimes. 
13 
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CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that in view of the as-
signments of, eTror as brought out in the points of this 
brief that the sentence and judgment of the Trial Court 
should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LOIDS H. CALLISTER and 
LOUIS H. CALLISTER, JR. 
Attorneys for A.ppella;nts 
619 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, lTtah 
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